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bstract
This paper investigates how the level of competition affects diversification and stability using a sample of 978 banks in 55 emerging and
eveloping countries over an eight year period 2000–2007. We shed further light on the competition-stability nexus by examining the complex
nteraction between three key variables: the degree of bank market power, diversification and stability. The core finding is that competition increases
tability as diversification across  and within  both interest and non-interest income generating activities of banks increases. Our analysis identifies
evenue diversification as a channel through which competition affects bank insolvency risk in emerging countries. The results are robust to an
rray of controls including alternative methodology, variable specifications and the regulatory environments that banks operate in.
 2013 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. 
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.  Introduction
Competition in banking is important for the efficient produc-
ion of financial services, the quality of financial products and
he degree of financial innovation (Claessens and Laeven, 2004).
n addition the literature has identified six reasons why compe-
ition in the financial sector is important: firstly, for firms and
ouseholds to access financial services (Beck et al., 2004), sec-
ndly, for proper functioning of the financial sector (Claessens
nd Laeven, 2005), thirdly, for stability of the financial sys-
em (Boyd et al., 2004), fourthly, for efficient management of
nancial intermediaries (Berger and Hannan, 1989), fifthly, for
mprovement of monetary policy transmission through the inter-
ank market rates (Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2008), and finally,∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +233 244232879; fax: +233 302 500024.
E-mail addresses: amidu@ug.edu.gh (M. Amidu), ssjw@soton.ac.uk
S. Wolfe).
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879-9337 © 2013 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier
.V.   
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rdf.2013.08.002
c
c
d
i
f
c
a
t
r
 Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.or overall industrial and economic growth (Allen and Gale,
004).
While the debate on whether competition influences bank
tability continues (Berger et al., 2009), the question of why
ompetition should have a soundness-enhancing effect remains
 relatively unexplored area. In this paper, we examine the mech-
nisms through which competition impacts bank stability. Vives
2011) reveals two basic channels through which competition
ffects stability. The first of these channels is that competition
ncreases instability by exacerbating the coordination problem
f depositors on the liability side and fostering bank runs which
ay be systemic in nature. The second is by increasing the incen-
ive to take on more risk on either side of the balance sheet
nd thereby raising probabilities of failure. The 2007 financial
risis has also identified bank funding structure and financial
nnovation in bank activities as potential sources through which
ompetition may affect stability (OECD, 2010). Equally, finan-
ial instruments such as loans sales, credit default swaps and
erivatives have turned out to be important sources of instability
n the financial sector.
Both Turk-Ariss (2010) and Schaeck and Cihak (2010b)
ocus on bank efficiency as a possible conduit through which
ompetition influences bank soundness. Tabak et al. (2012)
rgue that bank size and capitalization are the essential factors
hat explain the relationship between competition and the
isk-taking behaviour of banks. Beck et al. (2013) however,
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uggest that an increase in competition will have a larger impact
n banks’ fragility in countries with stricter activity restrictions,
ower systemic fragility, better developed stock exchanges,
ore generous deposit insurance and more effective systems of
redit information sharing. Our paper contends that competition
ressurises banks to adopt strategies to diversify and this
ecision affects bank insolvency risk. Apart from changes in
he competitive environment that trigger banks to diversify
heir activities Gardener and Molyneux (1990), other drivers
hat cause banks to diversify include: a hedging strategy (Froot
nd Stein, 1998); a mechanism to improve profitability and
perational efficiency (Landskroner et al., 2005); reinforcing
he function of banks as delegated monitors (Baele et al., 2007).
espite these reasons, the impact of diversification on bank
nsolvency risk has been mixed. Stiroh (2004), Hirtle and Stiroh
2007) and Mercieca et al. (2007) find no benefits for diversifi-
ation. On the contrary, researchers such as (Landskroner et al.,
005; Baele et al., 2007; Sanya and Wolfe, 2011) reveal that
iversification increases bank stability. Though the above argu-
ents present a sound theoretical and empirical underpinning
f the relationship between competition, diversification and sta-
ility, to the best of our knowledge this paper will be the first to
nvestigate the role of diversification in the competition-stability
elationship employing a panel dataset for banks in emerging
conomies.
This paper contributes to literature, especially on emerg-
ng/developing economies, by identifying the significance of
iversification for the relationship between competition and
tability. Three stage least squares (3SLS) is employed to simul-
aneously analyse the effect of diversification on competition
nd stability. The Lerner index is used as a measure of banking
ompetition, while revenue diversification is measured by con-
tructing Herfindahl Hirschman Indices (HHI) for each bank.
his measure accounts for diversification between banks’ major
ctivities: net-interest income and non-interest income. On bank
tability measures, Z-score (log); risk adjusted profits; bank cap-
talization level; and the ratios of non-performing loans to total
ross loans are used. Z-score is used as a measure of overall
ank insolvency risk; risk adjusted profit is used as a measure
f profitability; the volume of non-performing loans to total
ross loans measures bank loan portfolio risk; and finally the
quity capital to asset ratio accounts for the bank capitalization
evel.
Our results show that competition increases bank stability.
his is because banks make decisions to diversify their port-
olio in response to the competitive environment in which they
perate. Furthermore, the results show that competition not only
mproves stability, it also enhances bank performance mea-
ured by risk adjusted return on both assets and on equity
RAROE). More importantly, these relationships hold when
on-performing loans ratio and bank capitalization are used as
easures of stability. On contestability, the results reveal that
he regulatory initiative that requires high regulatory capital
nd protects property rights reduces insolvency risk. The over-
ll contribution of this paper is that it shows empirically that
ompetition increases bank stability, and that the effect is due
o the decision that banks make to diversify their portfolios in
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esponse to the competitive environment in which they oper-
te.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews
oth theoretical and empirical arguments on the relationship
etween banking sector competition, diversification, and sta-
ility, Section 3 specifies the measurement and construction of
he key variables, data and econometric specifications, Section 4
iscusses and presents the empirical results, and finally, Section
 concludes.
.  Related  literature
The theoretical literature on the link between competition and
tability is inconclusive. On one hand competition in banking
as been shown to improve stability. On the other hand the-
ry suggests it adversely affects banking stability. Those who
upport the ‘competition-fragility view’ suggest that monopo-
istic banks operating in uncompetitive banking systems may
nhance profits and reduce financial fragility by maintaining
igher levels of capital that protects them from external eco-
omic and liquidity shocks. A bank with more market power
njoys higher profits and has more to lose if it takes on more
isk. Keeley (1990) and Hellman et al. (2000) provide the so-
alled ‘franchise value’ hypothesis and argue that as a higher
ranchise value will result in higher opportunity costs when
ankruptcy occurs, bank managers as well as shareholders may
ot accept risky investments that could affect the stability of
he firm and thereby jeopardise their future earning streams.
atutes and Vives (2000) develop an imperfect competition
odel where banks are differentiated, have limited liability
nd experience social costs of failure. Furthermore, Boot and
hakor (2000) suggest that because large banks tend to engage
n credit rationing, they have fewer, but higher quality credit
nvestments which enhance their financial soundness. Besides,
arket power in the banking sector could lead to higher quality
f loan portfolios, improved capital allocation and thus max-
mise economic growth. Cetorelli and Peretto (2000) suggests
hat increased concentration in the banking sector and a reduc-
ion in information asymmetry gives banks the opportunity to
creen and differentiate between low and high quality borrow-
rs.
The proponents of the ‘competition-stability view’ on the
ther hand, argue that larger banks are often more likely to
eceive public guarantees and thus, are inefficiently managed
nd likely to fail. Under Mishkin (1999), the so-called ‘too-
ig-to-fail’ concept posits that as banks become too large, the
oral hazard problem becomes more severe for the manager
ho takes on risky investments with the knowledge of being
rotected under the government’s safety net. Moreover, the
igher loan rates charged by monopolistic banks may induce
orrowers to take on risky investments to compensate for higher
oan repayments. Thus, the likelihood of loan defaults may
ncrease and induce a higher probability of bank failure (Boyd
nd De Nicolo, 2005). It is argued that a bank’s size is asso-
iated with organisational complexity making it difficult to
anage efficiently. Moreover, size allows banks to expand across
ultiple geographical markets, business lines and complex
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nancial instruments which can be detrimental to their stabil-
ty.
The empirical literature on the relationship between com-
etition and banking system stability has revealed ambiguous
esults. De Nicolo et al. (2004) show that a higher level of sys-
emic risk is positively associated with a concentrated banking
ystem. Similarly, De Nicolo and Loukoianova (2006) find a
ositive and significant relationship between bank concentra-
ion and bank risk of failure. The result is even stronger when
ank ownership is controlled and strongest when state-owned
anks have sizeable market share. Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009)
nd a negative relationship between bank concentration and
nancial soundness. In contrast to the above empirical litera-
ure, Beck et al. (2006) provide empirical evidence that suggests
hat increased banking concentration does not result in higher
anking system fragility. Schaeck et al. (2009), find evidence
or the trade-off between competition and banks’ risk-taking
ehaviour. Their study reveals that banks hold higher capi-
al buffers when operating in a more competitive environment
nd competitive banking systems are less prone to experience
ystemic crisis. Berger et al. (2009) find support for the ‘two
iews’: on the competition-stability view, their study reveals that
anks with a higher degree of market power bear significantly
ore loan portfolio risk; and on the competition-fragility view,
heir findings suggest that banks with more market power have
ess overall risk exposure. Boyd et al. (2009) find that banks’
robability of failure is positively and significantly related to
oncentration. Carletti et al. (2007) reveal that merged banks
ecrease their reserve because of diversification effect and that
erger affects loan market competition, which in turn mod-
fies the distribution of bank sizes and liquidity needs. On
he relationship between competition and capitalization level,
chaeck and Cihak (2010a) and Allen et al. (2005) show that
hen credit markets are competitive, market discipline emanat-
ng from the asset side induces banks to hold positive levels
f capital as a way to commit to monitor and attract borrow-
rs. In sum, the empirical literature on the competition-stability
elationship is silent on the channel through which banking sec-
or competition affects stability. This gap is what our paper
ddresses. We argue that diversification strategy is the con-
uit through which competition makes banks more financially
ound.
.  Data  and  methodology
.1.  Construction  of  variables
.1.1.  Competitive  indicators
We employ the Lerner  index  as a measure of competition for
he sample. The index provides a direct measure of the degree of
arket power as it represents the mark-up of price over marginal
ost. It is the only measure of competition according to (Berger
t al., 2009) calculated at the bank level as:ernerit = Priceit −  MCit
Priceit
(1)
i
i
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here Priceit is the price of total assets. MCit is the marginal cost
f producing an additional unit of output. The MCit are derived
rom the translog cost function as:
n  Costit =  β0 +  β1 ln Qit + β22 ln Q
2
it
+
3∑
k=1
γkt ln Wk,it +
3∑
k=1
φk ln Qit ln Wk,it
+
3∑
k=1
3∑
j=1
δij ln Wk,it ln Wj,it
+
3∑
i=1
(
δi
2
)
ln W2j,it +
2∑
k=1
ηktrend
k
+
3∑
i=1
ςi ln Wj,it trend  +  v  ln Qj,it trend  +  εj (2)
here Cost  is the bank’s total costs including financial and oper-
ting cost; Qit represents a proxy for bank output measured as
otal assets, and W1, W2 and W3 indicate the input price of deposit
unds, labour and capital and these are respectively calculated as
he ratio of interest expenses to total deposits and money market
unds, labour cost to total assets, and other operating expenses
o total assets. The cost function is estimated separately using
 panel data for each country in the sample. This allows for
he parameters of the cost function to vary from one country to
nother, reflecting different technologies. Once the cost func-
ion is estimated, marginal cost is evaluated by taking the first
erivative with respect to the output for each bank in the sample.
ence, the marginal cost is calculated for each bank as:
Cit = Costit
Qit
[
β1 + β2 ln Qit +
3∑
k=1
φk ln Wk,it + ν trendit
]
(3)
The Lerner index is interpreted as follows: an index with a
igher value implies higher pricing power and less competitive
arket conditions.
.1.2. Diversiﬁcation  measures
In line with Mercieca et al. (2007) revenue diversification is
easured by constructing Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI)
or each bank. This measure accounts for diversification between
ajor activities. HHI(REV) for each bank is calculated as:
HI(REV ) =
(
NON
NETOP
)2
+
(
NET
NETOP
)2
(4)
here NETOP  = NON  + NET.
NON  represents non-interest income; net-interest income
s captured by NET; and NETOP  accounts for net-operating
ncome. Eq. (4) is interpreted as: a rise in HHI shows an increase
n revenue concentration and less diversification. This process
evelop
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s repeated for the construction of diversification within non-
nterest activities:
HI(NON) =
(
COM
NON
)2
+
(
TRD
NON
)2
+
(
OTOP
NON
)2
(5)
here NON  = COM  + TRD  + OTOP.
Where COM  stands for revenue arising from commission
ncome. TRD  represents trading income and OTOP  captures
ther operating income. Higher values of both HHI(REV) and
HI(NON) indicate greater concentration.
.1.3. Insolvency  risk  measures
Z-score  measures the number of standard deviations that a
ank’s profit must fall to drive it into insolvency. The index
otentially measures the accounting distance to default for a
iven institution and it is calculated as:
-score = ROA  +  E/TA
σROA
(6)
here ROA  is the rate of return on assets of a bank, E/TA  rep-
esents bank equity as a percentage of total assets and σROA
s the standard deviation of return on assets. The bank stability
ndicator increases with higher profitability and capitalization
evels, and decreases with unstable earnings reflected by a higher
tandard deviation of return on assets. Thus from an economic
oint of view, the Z-score initially measures the probability of a
ank becoming insolvent when the value of assets falls below the
alue of debt. This means that a higher (lower) Z-score implies
 lower (higher) probability of insolvency risk. To improve the
egression’s goodness of fit and to reduce possible simultaneous
ias the values of Z-score are logged.
Additionally, we use bank-specific data to calculate the two
isk adjusted performance measures of return on assets (RAROA)
nd return on equity (RAROE) by dividing ROA  and ROE  by their
espective standard deviation (σ) as:
ARROA = ROA
σROA
and RARROE = ROE
σROE
(7)
here ROA  is the ratio of income before tax to total assets and
OE is calculated as net income divided by total equity.
The ratio of non-performing  loans  to total gross loans is used
o proxy for loan portfolio risk. The use of bad loans as a proxy
or loan portfolio risk takes into account: (i) the risk should not
mply a higher risk of bank failure if the asset allocation tilts
owards a larger holding of risk free assets and (ii) the meas-
res at best should capture the default risk related to the loan
ortfolio. For the purpose of this paper, the measures of loan
uality have an independent effect in so far as they relate to the
robability of borrower failure to honour obligations and that a
igher value indicates a riskier loan portfolio. It is calculated as
on-performing loans to total loans.
Capitalization  ratio is used as a proxy for bank stability
ecause the 1998 Basel Accord has made banks increasingly
ocus on managing their capital base as a buffer against default.
artin (1977) also argues that the default risk of banks is directly
elated to the risk inherent in a bank’s asset portfolio and its cap-
talization. Allen et al. (2005) on their part build a model to show
b
(
p
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hat bank equity capital is higher in competitive credit markets,
here, in their opinion, good lending opportunities are scarce.
ank capitalization level is measured as the ratio of equity cap-
tal to total assets where a higher ratio indicates lower bank
nsolvency risk.
We also control for variables that affect competition, diver-
ification and stability. The ratio of total loans to total assets
loan/asset) explores banks’ investment mix and it is calculated
s total loans divided by total assets. Deposits to total liability
atio (deposit/liability) is used as a measure of funding structure
nd liquidity sources of banks. Following Demirguc-Kunt and
uizinga (2010) who examine the effect of funding strategy on
ank risk behaviour, the bank funding structure is measured as
otal deposits as a percentage of total liabilities. Return on Assets
ROA) measures bank performance in terms of the ability to gen-
rate profits after considering operating expenses. Thus it takes
nto account operating income and expenses. ROA is calculated
s profit before tax as a percentage of total assets. Financial lib-
ralisation index is a database constructed by Abiad et al. (2010)
hat recognises the multi-faceted nature of ﬁnancial  reform  and
ecords financial policy changes along seven different dimen-
ions. The liberalisation index measures financial reforms that
ave taken place during the period and it ranges from 0 to 21
ith the highest score indicating fully reformed. Capitalization
ndex measures overall capital  stringency  and it has been found
o reduce bank insolvency risk (Behr et al., 2010). Capitalization
ndex ranges from 0 to 9, with a higher value indicating greater
tringency. Supervisory  power  measures whether the authori-
ies have the power to take specific action to correct and prevent
roblems. It also ranges from 0 to 16 with higher values indicat-
ng more supervisory power. Property  rights  measure the degree
o which a country’s laws protect private property rights and the
egree to which government enforces those laws. It is an index
rom the Heritage Foundation and it is scaled from 0 to 100 with
igher values indicating greater freedom and legal property pro-
ection rights, respectively. GDP  growth  is used to control for
he general economic development, macroeconomic stability,
nd institutional framework as these are likely to affect banking
ystem performance in a country. GDP growth is measured as
he annual rate of growth of GDP. Inﬂation  is measured as the
nnual growth rate of the CPI index.
.2.  Data  sources
This paper employs both micro bank-level and macro
ountry-level data. Bank level data is taken from the most
ecent Bankscope database. All data are reported in US dol-
ars and are expressed in constant prices where appropriate. As
he study focuses on bank intermediation, we limit the empir-
cal analysis to the unconsolidated statement of banks. These
elections enable us to reduce the possibility of introducing
ggregation bias into the results. The sample includes all com-
ercial banks, cooperative banks, development banks, savingsanks, real estate and mortgage banks for which annual data
at least three sequential observations) are available during the
eriod 2000–2007. This dataset covers approximately 85% of
otal banking assets in the emerging and developing countries
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xamined. Macro data is obtained from the World Development
ndicators of the World Bank (2008) and International Finan-
ial Statistics database. Activity restrictions, capital stringency
nd supervisory power variables are obtained from Barth et al.
2004), while the banking freedom and property rights variables
re obtained from the Heritage Foundation (2010). Liberalisa-
ion index is obtained from Abiad et al. (2010).
.3.  Estimation  methods  and  procedures
The analysis of the relationship of interest follows a structural
odel proposed by Keeley (1990). The equations are presented
imultaneously as follows:
it =  α0 +  α1Lit +  Dit +
k∑
j=4
αjXi,j +  εit (8)
it =  α0 +  α1Lit +
k∑
j=4
αjXi,j +  εit (9)
here the Zit is a proxy for bank stability of bank i  in period t, Lit
s competition measured using the Lerner index, the Dit is bank
evenue diversification, the variables Xi,j are a set of {k}  vari-
bles controlling for bank-specific characteristics, the respective
ountries’ macroeconomic environments and regulatory vari-
bles. α’s are the parameter vectors; and εit are the unobserved
isturbances. To account for an endogeneity bias in the model, a
hree-stage-least-squares (3SLS) simultaneous equation model
s used. Stability, competition and revenue diversification are
pecified as endogenous variables. 3SLS produces estimates
rom a three-step process: firstly, it develops instrumented values
or all endogenous variables; then obtains a consistent esti-
ate for the covariance matrix of the equation disturbances, and
nally, performs a GLS-type estimation using the covariance
atrix. Furthermore, in the presence of an endogeneity bias and
orrect specification of structural equation models, the 3SLS
roduces more consistent and precise estimates of coefficients
han those produced by two stage least squares (2SLS) (Deng
t al., 2007; Mantecon, 2009).
In addition to the variables and 3SLS discussed, the use of
nstrumental variables (IV) technique helps to explicitly spec-
fy the instruments. Three instruments that are found in the
iterature to affect competition and banking stability are used:
ctivity restrictions, banking and financial freedom and bank
ize. Schaeck and Cihak (2010a) use similar instruments with
 two stage least squares (2SLS) estimator. Activity  restrictions
easure the degree to which national authorities allow banks to
ngage in activities that generate non-interest income. That is, it
ndicates the limits imposed on commercial banks to participate
n securities markets, insurance and real estate activities. The
easure varies from 4 to 16 with higher scores indicating more
estrictions. The banking  freedom  variable provides an overall
easure of the openness of the banking sector and the extent to
hich banks are free to operate their businesses. The measure
escribes a country’s financial climate and assigns an overall
core between 0 and 100 percent, with a higher percentage score
a
f
a
mment Finance 3 (2013) 152–166
ignifying more freedom. Finally, the natural logarithm of total
ssets is used as a proxy for bank  size.
.  Empirical  results
.1.  Descriptive  statistics
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the key variables used
n this study. All bank-specific variables are averaged by bank
uring the period 2000–2007, while that of the country-level
ariables are averaged by country over the period under study.
ithin the sample period, the average H-statistic is (0.65)
howing that the banking systems of the selected countries are
haracterised by monopolistic competition. A competitive envi-
onment indicator for the selected countries banking systems is
resented in Appendix A. H-statistic is employed as a proxy
or the degree of competition. The score of H-statistic  (with
he exception of Burkina Faso and Tanzania) varies between
.25 and 0.90 meaning that the best description of the degree of
ompetition among selected banks is monopolistic competition.
lso, the estimation result provides no strong pattern among
he countries sampled. The mean value for the Lerner index in
able 1 is 25%, meaning that banks on average are pricing their
roducts at around 25% above marginal cost. On the measures
f overall bank insolvency risk, the sample includes both high
nd low stable banks. The 15 percentage aggregate equity ratio
mplies that just less than a sixth of the assets of the selected
anks are financed with equity capital. The sample mean of
0% of HHI(rev) and 54% of HHI(non) suggest diversification
f bank revenue towards non-interest generating activities. On
he pattern of intermediation, on average (51%) of the sample
anks’ assets are extended as loans. Of the liabilities of the sam-
le banks (79%) constitute core deposits. This means that more
han three quarters of emerging countries assets are financed by
ore deposits. Total asset measures denominated in US dollars is
sed as a proxy for bank size. The average bank size is $6.86 bil-
ion. Profitability of the sample banks is about 1.7% of the assets
hile the average GDP growth is 5.2% with the consumer price
ndex at 7.7%.
.2.  Does  revenue  diversiﬁcation  affect  the
ompetition-stability  relationship?
This sub-section analyses the relationship between compe-
ition indicators and measures of stability, as well as further
nvestigating whether revenue diversification affects these rela-
ionships. Table 2 reports the 3SLS regression results that have
s the dependent variables, bank insolvency risk (Z-score) for
olumn 1, risk-adjusted profits (RAROA  and RAROE) for column
 and 3, respectively, capitalisation ratio (equity/assets) for col-
mn 4 and loan portfolio risk with the ratio of non-performing
oans to total loans (bad loans) for column 5. Column 6 uses
n alternative measure of revenue diversification (HHIrev). In
ddition, the table reports the F-statistics which provide a test
or the joint significance of the regression coefficients as well
s the set of three instruments employed in the regression esti-
ates. Table 2 is also divided into two panels. Panel A presents
M. Amidu, S. Wolfe / Review of Development Finance 3 (2013) 152–166 157
Table 1
Summary statistics on selected bank level variables.
Mean Median SD Min Max
Market structure
H-statistic 0.648 0.639 0.188 0.089 1.084
Lerner index 0.246 0.261 0.244 0.000 0.994
Bank insolvency risk
Insolvency risk (Z-score) 18.69 13.65 17.49 −0.97 171.92
Risk adjusted return on assets (RAROA) 2.482 1.984 2.897 −5.103 24.352
Risk adjusted return on equity (RAROE) 2.532 1.965 3.002 −4.819 22.218
Ratio of equity to assets (Equity) 0.151 0.107 0.147 0.003 0.997
Ratio of bad loans to total loans (Bad loans) 0.082 0.043 0.106 0.000 0.992
Diversiﬁcation
Revenue diversification (HHIrev) 0.601 0.560 0.137 0.047 0.995
Diversification within non-interest income (HHInon) 0.538 0.507 0.156 0.237 0.999
Commission inc to non-interest income (Commˆ2) 0.310 0.270 0.250 0.000 0.990
Non-interest inc to net operating revenue (Nonˆ2) 0.177 0.127 0.180 0.000 0.997
Bank-speciﬁc control variables
Ratio of loans to assets (Loans) 0.513 0.529 0.205 0.000 0.999
Ratio of deposits to liabilities (Deposits) 0.789 0.877 0.230 0.001 1.000
Total assets in US $million (Size) 6865 506 45,370 0.100 1,266,097
Return on assets (ROA) 0.017 0.016 0.046 −0.870 0.538
Macroeconomic indicators
Annual growth of GDP growth 0.052 0.052 0.039 −0.127 0.206
Annual consumer price index Inflation 0.077 0.054 0.084 −0.082 0.982
Source: Bankscope and authors’ own calculation. The data comprises of 978 banks across 55 countries over the period 2000–2007.
Table presents summary statistics on selected bank-specific variables. H-statistic is a measure of competitiveness in the banking sector. The degree of market power is
proxied by the Lerner Index or the price mark-up over marginal cost, with the higher scores indicating a higher degree of pricing power. Z-score (log) is a measure on
insolvency risk. Risk adjusted return on assets (RAROA) and of equity (RAROE) measure overall performance. Bank equity represents average capitalization level and
is used as a proxy for the degree of risk. Bad loans are a proportion of non-performing loans to total loans. HHI(rev) and HHI(non) measure revenue diversification
across interest income and within non-interest income generating activities, respectively. Commˆ2 is a square of commission income to non-interest income and Nonˆ2
is the square of non-interest income to net-operating income. Loans and deposits are ratios of loans to assets and deposits to liabilities, respectively. They measure a
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he main relationship of interest between competition and per-
ormance. It also shows the independent effect of competition on
ank performance. Panel B on the other hand shows the impact
f competition on revenue diversification. As earlier stated, the
ain argument of this paper is to examine whether or not revenue
iversification influences the competition-stability relationship.
anel B shows if this hypothesis holds for the selected sample
f banks in developing and emerging economies. That is, Panel
 indicates whether or not banks diversify their activities as a
esult of greater competition.
In Panel A of Table 2, the coefficient of the Lerner index is
egative and statistically significant implying that an increase in
anking competition has a significant positive effect on the over-
ll stability of banks in emerging and developing markets.1 This
nding corresponds to the ‘competition-stability view’ in the
heoretical literature and is generally consistent with empirical
ndings of (De Nicolo et al., 2004; Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009) that an increase in the competitiveness of national banking sys-
ems increases individual bank financial soundness. However, in
ontrasts this result supports neither theory (Beck et al., 2006)
1 A Lerner index with a higher value implies higher pricing power and less
ompetitive market conditions.
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elity. GDP growth and inflation are used as measures of economic development.
or empirical work on the ‘competition-fragility view’ (Berger
t al., 2009). Next we analyse the association between our com-
etitive measure and risk-adjusted return on assets (RAROA)
nd Equity (RAROE). Similarly, the Lerner index has a nega-
ive association with both RAROA and RAROE suggesting that
anks in emerging countries profit from operating in more com-
etitive banking environments. This finding is also in line with
he general concept that competition brings about efficiency and
nnovation, which reduces costs, and which in turn translates into
igher rates of return. This return is in both absolute terms and
n a risk-adjusted basis. Column 4 of Table 2 seeks to establish
hether banks operating in highly competitive banking markets
old more equity capital. Banks hold equity capital as a cushion
o absorb any losses emanating from their operations. The liter-
ture is inconclusive on the effect of the degree of competition
n equity capital holding. While Berger et al. (2009) findings
uggest that bank capitalisation levels are high for banks with
igher market power, Schaeck and Cihak (2010a) find the oppo-
ite, that competition provides incentives for banks to maintain
igher capital ratios. Our results provide significant evidence
o support the fact that a banking system structure explains
he capitalisation level of banks in emerging and developing
ountries. The coefficient is negative indicating that banks in
merging and developing markets maintain a higher capital ratio
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Table 2
Three stage least square (3SLS) regression results of bank performance.
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variables
Z-score RAROA RAROE Equity/assets Bad loans Z-score
Alternative measure of revenue div
HHI(rev)
Lerner index −0.881** −1.995*** −1.078** −0.164*** 0.548*** 0.471***
(0.360) (0.394) (0.441) (0.044) (0.063) (0.073)
HHI(non) −0.553*** 0.231 −0.093 −0.089*** −0.071**
(0.157) (0.194) (0.198) (0.020) (0.028)
Non incomeˆ2 −0.638*** −0.352*** −0.660*** 0.065*** −0.030* −0.900***
(0.094) (0.117) (0.127) (0.012) (0.016) (0.086)
Loans 0.311*** 0.223** 0.022 −0.023** −0.028* 0.367***
(0.082) (0.101) (0.104) (0.010) (0.017) (0.085)
Deposits −0.121 0.00009 −0.021 −0.121*** 0.039** 0.033
(0.087) (0.101) (0.106) (0.011) (0.015) (0.083)
GDP growth 0.013 0.064* 0.078** −0.001 −0.056*** −0.068***
(0.030) (0.033) (0.036) (0.003) (0.005) (0.024)
HHI(rev) −0.380
(0.488)
Panel B Dependent variables
HHI(non) HHI(non) HHI(non) HHI(non) HHI(non) HHI(rev)
Lerner index 0.571*** 0.442*** 0.522*** 0.615*** 0.452*** 0.057***
(0.085) (0.056) (0.060) (0.080) (0.080) (0.009)
Com incomeˆ2 0.390*** 0.381*** 0.393*** 0.391*** 0.424*** −0.011
(0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008)
Loans −0.034 0.013 0.029 −0.067** 0.009 0.245***
(0.034) (0.026) (0.028) (0.033) (0.030) (0.020)
Deposits −0.045*** −0.072*** −0.056*** −0.039** −0.076*** −0.087***
(0.017) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.015) (0.009)
Securities/asset 0.031 0.113*** 0.103*** −0.008 0.040 0.196***
(0.038) (0.028) (0.030) (0.037) (0.035) (0.021)
GDP growth −0.007 0.001 0.003 −0.009 −0.005 −0.004
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
Panel A No. of obs. 4103 4466 3811 4127 2726 4161
F-stats 23.91*** 12.48*** 11.61*** 30.75*** 23.87*** 35.62***
Panel B No. of obs. 4103 4466 3811 4127 2726 4161
F-stats 198.92** 274.45*** 237.35*** 204.24** 228.98 50.31***
Table shows the Three stage least squares (3SLS) regression results of bank insolvency risk using alternative measures of market structure. The dependant variables
for panel A are measures of bank overall risk: Z-score (log), RAROA, RAROE, Equity/assets, and Bad loans ratio and dependent variable for panel B are measures
of revenue diversification: HHI(non) and HHI(rev). These are regressed on selected explanatory variables: the degree of market power is proxied by the Lerner Index
or the price mark-up over marginal cost, with higher scores indicating a higher degree of pricing power. HHI(rev) and HHI(non) measure revenue diversification
across interest income and within non-interest income generating activities, respectively. Non-incomeˆ2 is the square of non-interest income to net operating income.
Loans and deposits are ratios of loans to assets and deposits to liabilities, respectively. Com-incomeˆ2 is a square of commission income to non-interest income. Ratio
of securities/assets is measured as total investment in securities divided by total assets. The regressions use instruments for Lerner index and the instruments used are
(1) activity restrictions, an index of regulatory restriction on bank activities; (2) banking freedom provides overall measures of the openness of the banking sector
and (3) natural logarithm of total assets in millions of US$ (size). The dependent variables and the measures of competitive structure are treated as endogenous. The
parameters are estimated with the small sample adjusted standard errors in parenthesis. p-Value of F-test takes into account the significance of identifying instruments.
* Statistical significance at the 10% level.
*
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o** Statistical significance at the 5% level.
** Statistical significance at the 1% level.
2s the competition level increases. Regarding the relationship
etween the Lerner index and loan portfolio risk (bad loans), the
esult is positive and significant. This means that a high degree
2 This finding collaborates with Allen et al. (2005) assertion that greater credit
arket competition increases capital holdings as it introduces market discipline
rom the asset side (loan rates).
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 proportion of total loans. In an environment where banking
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owers return on investment increases which in turn decrease the
isk of default and consequently non-performing loans will be
ower. Furthermore, a low cost of capital also enables borrowers
o increase their return on capital, increase cashflow from invest-
ent and thus be able to service their bank loans. This finding
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Fig. 1. Degree of competition in emerging markets as measured by Lerner index.
Data is aggregated averaging across countries over eight years, 2000–2007.
Source: Bankscope and authors’ calculation.
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Fig. 2. Revenue diversification of banks in emerging/developing economies
(HHInon). Data is aggregated averaging across countries over eight years,
2000–2007.
Source: Bankscope and authors’ calculation.
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Fig. 3. Insolvency risk level of banks in emerging/developing economies (Z-
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period, 2000–2007. Fig. 1 shows the trend of degree of compe-
tition (Lerner  index), in emerging/developing markets, Fig. 2
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s consistent with the ‘competition-stability view’ of (Boyd and
e Nicolo, 2005) that greater bank competition is associated
ith low loan losses.
Bank funding structure (deposit/liabilities) and that of lend-
ng (loan/assets) are found to have an impact on bank insolvency
isk. Banks depending on wholesale funding have been severely
ffected during the current financial crisis while those in
ustralia and Canada for example have been more resilient
o the crisis because they rely mostly on depository funding
OECD, 2010). These two bank-specific variables are controlled
nd reported in Panel A of Table 2. The coefficient of loan/assets
s positive on both insolvency risk and profitability but negative
n capitalization and loan portfolio risk. This means that bank
ending in developing countries is associated with a decrease in
apitalization ratio, lower loan portfolio risk, and higher perfor-
ance and therefore an increase in the financial soundness of
anks. Intuitively, banks that provide quality loans hold low lev-
ls of capital and consequently do not need additional capital to
bsorb losses. Furthermore, the profitability level of such banks
s enhanced because low provisions are made in connection to
oan losses. The result provides no evidence of negative conse-
uences of depository funding of banks in developing countries.
rowth in GDP improves profitability and reduces the non-
erforming loan ratio. The relationship between competition
nd stability as reported in Table 2 is well established in the
anking literature. The ambiguity lies between the channels of
nstability. In order to further analyse whether or not compe-
ition affects insolvency risk through diversification, there has
o be an independent effect of competition on diversification.
hat is, the extent to which high levels of competition impact on
iversification. This means that the Lerner  index  must influence
HI(non) and HHI(rev) significantly.
Using Eqs. (8) and (9), the regression results in Panel B are
imultaneously estimated with those in Panel A. In Table 2 the
oefficient for Lerner  index  reported in Panel B is positive and
tatistically significant across all specifications. The same results
re obtained when HHI(rev), an alternative measure of revenue
iversification is used in column 6. These results imply that
ompetition exerts pressure on banks in emerging/developing
conomies to diversify both across and within non-interest
ncome generating activities.3 The results also show that banks
refer to diversify within the market they already operate in
ompared to a new market. This is because the coefficient of
he impact of competition on HHI(non) is relatively larger than
hat of HHI(rev). Again, it could be a precautionary strategy as
anks take into account risk of entering into a new market. Sim-
lar results are reported when H-statistic  an alternative measure
f the degree of competition is used in Table 3. Thus, Panel B
f both Tables 2 and 3 confirm that the degree of competition
as an independent effect on diversification. In a nutshell, the
esults of Tables 2 and 3 provide empirically, an additional chan-
el (revenue diversification) through which competition affects
nsolvency risk of banks in developing and emerging markets.
3 A lower level of Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) means increased diver-
ification.
F
D
Score). Data is aggregated averaging across years, 2000–2007.
ource: Bankscope and authors’ calculation.
In addition to the regression results reported in Table 2, Figs.
–4 are used to further discuss the effect of revenue diversifica-
ion on competition-stability relationship. The data is aggregated0
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ig. 4. Performance of banks in emerging/developing economies (RAROA).
ata is aggregated averaging across years, 2000–2007.
ource: Bankscope and authors’ calculation.
160 M. Amidu, S. Wolfe / Review of Development Finance 3 (2013) 152–166
Table 3
Three stage least square (3SLS) regression results of bank performance using alternative measure of market structure.
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variables
Z-score RAROA RAROE Equity/assets Bad loans Z-score
Alternative measure of revenue diversification
HHI(rev)
H-statistic 0.897*** 1.030*** 1.166*** 0.004 −0.127*** 1.439***
(0.257) (0.304) (0.306) (0.031) (0.025) (0.300)
HHI(non) −0.909*** −0.208 −0.357* −0.105** −0.054***
(0.157) (0.190) (0.194) (0.019) (0.018)
Non-incomeˆ2 −0.703*** −0.698*** −0.765*** 0.024** 0.043*** −0.745***
(0.092) (0.112) (0.115) (0.011) (0.012) (0.090)
Loans 0.290*** 0.102 0.013 −0.033*** −0.039*** 0.496***
(0.080) (0.097) (0.100) (0.009) (0.010) (0.091)
Deposits 0.034 0.172* 0.162* −0.101*** −0.004 0.016
(0.075) (0.091) (0.093) (0.009) (0.009) (0.107)
GDP growth 0.028 0.111*** 0.107*** −0.008** −0.038** 0.0002
(0.028) (0.034) (0.035) (0.003) (0.003) (0.026)
HHI(rev) −1.527**
(0.758)
Panel B Dependent variables
HHI(non) HHI(non) HHI(non) HHI(non) HHI(non) HHI(rev)
H-statistic −0.270*** −0.265*** −0.259*** −0.274*** −0.153*** −0.098***
(0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.029) (0.035)
Com incomeˆ2 0.371*** 0.369*** 0.371*** 0.372*** 0.415*** −0.013*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007)
Loans −0.086*** −0.087*** −0.084*** −0.085*** −0.046*** 0.063***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009)
ROA −0.116 0.093 0.096 −0.195*** −0.054 0.338***
(0.075) (0.090) (0.094) (0.071) (0.083) (0.067)
Deposits −0.131*** −0.130*** −0.128*** −0.133*** −0.122*** −0.097***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009)
GDP growth 0.006 0.009** 0.009** 0.006* 0.009** −0.006**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Panel A No. of obs. 4137 3879 3841 4166 2758 4871
F-stats 32.91*** 15.29*** 16.69*** 29.29*** 35.05*** 36.67***
Panel B No. of obs. 4137 3879 3841 4166 2758 4871
F-stats 347.06*** 324.69*** 325.03** 351.82** 318.70*** 31.88**
Table presents the three stage least squares (3SLS) regression results of bank insolvency risk. The dependant variables for panel A are measures of bank overall
risk: Z-score (log), RAROA, RAROE, Equity/assets, and Bad loans ratio and dependent variable for panel B are measures of revenue diversification: HHI(non)
and HHI(rev). These are regressed on selected explanatory variables: H-statistic is a measure of competitiveness in the banking sector as discussed in Section 3.1.
HHI(rev) and HHI(non) measure revenue diversification across interest income and within non-interest income generating activities, respectively. Non-incomeˆ2 is
the square of non-interest income to net-operating income. Loans and deposits are ratios of loan to assets and deposits to liabilities, respectively. Com-incomeˆ2 is a
square of commission income to non-interest income. ROA is return on assets and it measures profitability. The regressions use instruments for H-statistics and the
instruments used are (1) activity restrictions, an index of regulatory restriction on bank activities; (2) banking freedom provide overall measures of the openness of
the banking sector and (3) natural logarithm of total assets in millions of US$ (size). The dependent variables and the measures of competitive structure are treated
as endogenous. The parameters are estimated with the small sample adjusted standard errors in parenthesis. p-Value of F-test takes into account the significance of
identifying instruments.
* Statistical significance at the 10% level.
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Table 4
Regression results of bank performance: IV estimation.
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variables
Z-score RAROA RAROE Bad loans Z-score Z-score
Alternative measures of competitive structure and
revenue diversification
Lerner index HHI(rev)
H-statistic 3.840*** 2.245*** 1.744*** −0.144*** 3.653***
(0.444) (0.364) (0.337) (0.046) (0.585)
HHI(non) −0.245** −0.150 −0.303*** −0.019* −0.051
(0.110) (0.113) (0.111) (0.011) (0.127)
Non incomeˆ2 −0.436*** −0.645*** −0.743*** 0.058*** −0.652*** −0.453***
(0.113) (114) (0.113) (0.012) (0.135) (0.118)
Loans 0.355*** 0.110 0.036 −0.044*** 0.207* 0.349*
(0.092) (0.095) (0.095) (0.010) (0.109) (0.186)
Deposits 0.420*** 0.402*** 0.370*** −0.010 −0.495*** 0.445
(0.095) (0.926) (0.090) (0.010) (0.115) (0.308)
GDP growth 0.127*** 0.108*** 0.0758** −0.034*** 0.113*** 0.132***
(0.033) (0.329) (0.032) (0.003) (0.040) (0.038)
Inflation −0.174*** −0.077*** −0.076*** −0.001 −0.146*** −0.188***
(0.019) (0.318) (0.019) (0.002) (0.021) (0.039)
Lerner index −3.721***
(0.560)
HHI(rev) −0.029
(2.543)
Panel B Diagnostic tests
Test for overid:
Sargan N × R-sq test 2.00 34.45*** 70.22*** 0.117 2.38 0.000
Basmann test 2.00 34.64*** 71.17*** 0.116 2.37 0.000
No. of observation 4899 4564 4524 3195 4849 5352
R2 (uncentered) 0.82 0.19 0.24 0.40 0.79 0.82
F-test (p-value) 36.91*** 19.81*** 20.43*** 31.49*** 27.93*** 35.41***
Wu–Hausman F-test 147.44** 45.95*** 27.66*** 3.43*** 131.69*** 37.02***
Durbin–Wu–Hausman 143.39** 45.58** 27.55*** 3.44*** 128.44*** 73.16***
Table presents the regression results of bank risk: IV estimation The dependant variables are measures of overall risk: Z-score (log), RAROA, RAROE, and Bad loans ratio. These are regressed on selected explanatory
variables: H-statistic is a measure of competitiveness in the banking sector as discussed in Section 3.1. HHI(rev) and HHI(non) measure revenue diversification across interest income and within non-interest income
generating activities, respectively. Non-incomeˆ2 is the square of non-interest income to net-operating income. Loans and deposits are ratios of loans to assets and deposits to liabilities, respectively. GDP growth
measures business cycle fluctuation. Inﬂation is the rate of inflation based on the CPI. The degree of market power is proxied by the Lerner Index or the price mark-up over marginal cost, with the higher scores
indicating a higher degree of pricing power. The regression for column (1), (2), (3), (4) and (6) use instruments for H-statistics and regression for column (5) employ instruments for Lerner index. The instruments
used for specification are 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 are (1) activity restrictions, which is an index of regulatory restriction on bank activities; (2) banking freedom provides overall measures of the openness of the banking sector
and (3) natural logarithm of total assets in millions of US$ (size), while in specification 2, the activity restriction is dropped and replace with entry restriction. The parameters are estimated with the small sample
adjusted standard errors in parenthesis. Panel B reports diagnostic test: two tests (Sargan N × R2 and Basmann test) are reported for overidentifying restrictions measures instruments exogeneity. The R2 measures
the goodness of fit while the p-value of F-test measures the significance of identifying instruments. The Wu–Hausman F-test and Durbin–Wu–Hausman Chi2 specification compare the difference between the IV
and the OLS estimators. Regression column 6 is exactly identified and thus has 0.000 for both Sargan N × R sq and Basmann test. Bank and country fixed effects are excluded from the estimation.
* Statistical significance at the 10% level.
** Statistical significance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.
162 M. Amidu, S. Wolfe / Review of Development Finance 3 (2013) 152–166
Table 5
3SLS regression results of bank insolvency risk: controlling for regulatory variables.
Panel A Dependent variable: Z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
H-statistic 0.897*** 2.327*** 1.863*** 1.194*** 2.394***
(0.257) (0.262) (0.249) (0.256) (0.264)
HHI(non) −0.909*** −0.629*** −0.590*** −0.490*** −0.543***
(0.157) (0.170) (0.164) (0.158) (0.172)
Non incomeˆ2 −0.703*** −0.463*** −0.546*** −0.508*** −0.423***
(0.092) (0.098) (0.094) (0.091) (0.099)
Loans 0.290*** 0.347*** 0.279*** 0.346*** 0.387***
(0.080) (0.086) (0.084) (0.079) (0.086)
Deposits 0.034 0.142* 0.115 0.164** 0.205**
(0.075) (0.082) (0.078) (0.075) (0.082)
GDP growth 0.028 0.102*** 0.058** 0.118*** 0.103***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027) (0.030)
Financial reform 0.272***
(0.107)
Supervisory power −0.376***
(0.083)
Property rights 0.475***
(0.045)
Capital index 0.239***
(0.037)
Panel B Dependent variables
HHI(non) HHI(non) HHI(non) HHI(non) HHI(non)
H-statistic −0.270*** −0.301*** −0.283*** −0.284*** −0.264***
(0.034) (0.032) (0.027) (0.033) (0.032)
Com incomeˆ2 0.371*** 0.372*** 0.372*** 0.372*** 0.371***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Loans −0.086*** −0.085*** −0.085*** −0.086*** −0.086***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
ROA −0.116 −0.023 −0.043 −0.068 −0.028
(0.075) (0.077) (0.076) (0.076) (0.075)
Deposits −0.131*** −0.131*** −0.131*** −0.131*** −0.129***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
GDP growth 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Panel A No. of obs. 4137 4137 4137 4137 4137
F-stats 32.91*** 33.20*** 28.46*** 50.34*** 33.30***
Panel B No. of obs. 4137 4137 4137 4137 4137
F-stats 347.06*** 339.93*** 350.68** 344.89*** 350.38**
Table shows the 3SLS regression results of bank insolvency risk controlling for regulatory variables. The dependant variable for panel A is Z-score (log) and measures
bank insolvency risk and that of panel B is HHI(non) which is a measure of revenue diversification. These variables are regressed on selected explanatory variables.
H-statistic is a measure of competitiveness in the banking sector as discussed in Section 3.1. HHI(non) measures revenue diversification within non-interest income
generating activities. Non-incomeˆ2 is the square of non-interest income to net-operating income. Loans and deposits are ratios of loan to assets and deposits to
liabilities, respectively. Four regulatory and supervisory variables are included in the baseline regression: financial reforms, supervisory power, property rights and
capital index. Higher values of ﬁnancial reform indicate fully reformed. Supervisory power measures whether the authorities have the power to take specific action
to correct and prevent problems. It also ranges from 0 to 16 with higher values indicating more supervisory power. Higher scores of property rights indicate certainty
of legal protection of property rights and limited expropriation risks. Capital index measures overall capital stringency. It ranges from 0 to 9, with a higher value
indicating greater stringency. The regressions use instruments for H-statistic and the instruments used are (1) activity restrictions which is an index of regulatory
restriction on bank activities; (2) banking freedom provides overall measures of the openness of the banking sector and (3) natural logarithm of total assets in millions
of US$ (size). The dependent variables and the measures of competitive structure are treated as endogenous. The parameters are estimated with the small sample
adjusted standard errors in parenthesis. Country and bank fixed effects are not included in the estimates.
* Statistical significance at the 10% level.
** Statistical significance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.
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iversify their activities and this enables them to reduce their
nsolvency risk.
.3.  Alternative  measures  of  market  structure  and
ethodological  speciﬁcation
Table 3 presents the relationship between competition, rev-
nue diversification and bank insolvency risk using alternative
easures of competition. H-statistic  is based on a reduced-form
evenue equation, the so called Panzar and Rosse H-statistic.4
ere, the H-statistic is used to check the robustness of the earlier
ndings. The results are similar to results using Lerner index as
eported in Table 2. Even though the sign and the level of sig-
ificance are the same, the magnitudes of the coefficients are
lightly different. The high degree of competition in develop-
ng countries, ceteris  paribus, reduces bank insolvency risk and
isk in the loan portfolio, while increasing profitability, and the
olding of more equity capital.
Next is the analysis of the relationship of interest between
ompetition and bank stability using two stage least squares
2SLS) regression. Even though the use of 2SLS regression
oes not necessarily need an explicit specification of the base-
ine equation ((8) and (9)), the competitive measures (H-statistic
nd Lerner index), insolvency risk (Z-score) and revenue diver-
ification (HHInon or HHIrev) are still treated as endogenous.
he same sets of three instruments are used as discussed in Sec-
ion 3.3. In addition, 2SLS is used so that diagnostic tests can
e conducted to assess the fit of the model in a single equa-
ion setting. The results are presented in Table 4 and are similar
o that reported in Tables 2 and 3. The direction of the sign
nd the significance of the coefficients remain the same. The
nly difference between the results reported in Tables 2 and 3
nd that of Table 4 is the standard error. The standard error of
SLS is relatively larger than those produce in Tables 2 and 3
sing 3SLS. This finding supports the earlier argument that 3SLS
ields more precise and consistent estimates than 2SLS. The
se of these two estimation techniques shows that greater bank
ompetition increases stability with higher level of diversifica-
ion. The results of bank-specific and macroeconomic control
ariables remain unchanged.
Furthermore, the use of 2SLS allows for several diagnostic
2ests to be carried out. Two tests, Sargan N*R and Basmann
hi-squared tests are reported for over-identification restric-
ion measures of instruments exogeneity. The result rejects the
4 Panzar and Rosse (1987) define a measure of competition, the Has the sum
f the elasticities of the reduced-form revenue function with respect to factor
rices. They show that this statistic can reflect the structure and the conduct of
he market to which the firm belongs; it represents the percentage variation of the
quilibrium revenue derived from the unit percent increase in price of all factors
sed by the firm. His an increasing function of the demand elasticity e, that is,
he less market power is exercised on the part of banks, the higher Hbecomes.
t is calculated as the sum of the elasticities of the total interest income with
espect to the three input price of deposit funds, labour and capital and these
re respectively calculated as the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits and
oney market funds, labour cost to total assets, and other operating expenses to
otal assets. We test for equilibrium in all the sample countries and find that the
anking industries of most countries are in ‘equilibrium’ (not reported).
r
e
b
v
o
p
l
c
i
a
r
a
b
p
pment Finance 3 (2013) 152–166 163
lternative hypothesis that the instruments are correlated with the
rror term in column 1, 4, 5, and 6. The null hypothesis is that the
nstruments are uncorrelated with the unobserved term. The R2
easures the goodness of fit while the p-value of the F-test takes
nto account the significance of instruments. The Wu–Hausman
-test and Durbin–Wu–Hausman Chi2 specification compare
he difference between the use of instrumental variables (IV) and
rdinary least squares (OLS). In sum, the results using 2SLS esti-
ating techniques show that competition improves the financial
oundness of banks that diversify their activities.
.4.  Financial  reforms,  supervisory  and  regulatory  controls
Financial liberalisation, regulatory and institutional envi-
onments impact on banking sector competition. For instance
egulatory measures such as lower barriers to entry and fewer
estrictions on bank activities have been found to improve sys-
emic stability (Beck et al., 2006). Regressions in Table 5
xamine the impact of bank overall risk (Z-score) while
ontrolling additionally for a financial liberalisation index
financial reforms), regulatory and institutional variables (capi-
al stringency and supervision power) and risk of expropriation
property right). 3SLS regression is used as an estimator and to
ddress collinearity problems, the additional variables enter into
he regression one at a time. Even when financial reforms, super-
ision power, property rights and capital stringency index are
ontrolled, the results suggest that greater banking competition
nd revenue diversification remain positively associated with
ank stability. Table 5 also reports the results including finan-
ial reforms as an additional control variable. The coefficient is
ositive and significant implying that developing economies that
ave a banking system fully reformed will increase stability. The
oefficient on the supervision power is negative, that of property
ights and capital stringency are positive. Legal protection on pri-
ate property and the judicial efficiency in enforcing these laws
ncrease stability. The results also highlight the effectiveness of
apital regulation in reducing risk-taking.
.  Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature by analysing how
evenue diversification of banks in developing and emerging
conomies affects the relationship between competition and sta-
ility. Different risk exposure indicators are used as dependent
ariables to proxy for bank stability: the Z-score as a measure
f overall bank risk, the risk adjusted profit as a measure of
rofitability, the volume of non-performing loans to total gross
oans is used to measure bank loan portfolio risk, and the equity
apital to asset ratio to account for the level of bank capital-
zation. To account for simultaneity and address endogeneity,
nd to provide precise and consistent parameter estimates, 3SLS
egression estimates are used. Furthermore, we employ 2sls as
 robustness test.
The results show a positive and significant relationship
etween competition and stability. More importantly, this
ositive and significant relationship holds when risk adjusted
rofits are used as the dependent variable. This means that
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reater competition in a banking sector enhances stability.
n competition and bank capitalization, the results show that
iversified banks that operate in a competitive environment
end to hold relatively more equity capital though the result is
elatively insignificant. Our results also show that a competitive
nd diversified banking system is associated with less risky loan
ortfolios. Similar results are found when alternative measures
f the degree of competition and different methodological
pecifications are employed. Even when financial reforms,
upervisory power, property rights, capital stringency index
nd macroeconomic variables are controlled, the results
uggest that competition and revenue diversification remain
ositively associated with bank stability. The core finding is that
ompetition increases stability as bank diversification across
nd within  both interest and non-interest income generating
ctivities increases. Furthermore, our analysis identifies a
hannel through which competition affects bank insolvency risk
n developing/emerging markets. The results also comply with
he ‘competition-stability view’ in the theoretical literature and
re generally consistent with prior empirical findings that banks
hat operate in an uncompetitive banking industry are prone to
riginating riskier loans which are detrimental to their stability.
Finally, our results provide additional evidence for the cur-
ent debate on whether or not competition improves stability.
his paper provides valuable insights for regulatory authori-
ies, banking supervisors and market participants about the role
f diversification in competition and stability relationships. In
onclusion, the findings provide no evidence to support regula-
ory initiative that restricts both banking sector competition and
iversification activities.
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ppendix  A.
This section presents H-statistics for the banking system
f the selected countries. Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistic
s calculated as the average of implied H-statistics from four
ifferent structural models estimated for each country for the
ight year-period; 2000–2007 and is based on the Claessens
nd Laeven (2004) approach. H1 is estimated using pooled
LS with bank-specific and time dummies and gross interest
ncome as dependent variable in the reduced-form revenue equa-
ion. H2 is estimated using pooled GLS with time dummies
nd gross interest income as dependent variable in the reduced-
orm revenue equation. H3 is estimated using pooled OLS with
ank-specific and time dummies and total income as dependent
ariable in the reduced-form revenue equation. H4 is estimated
sing pooled GLS with time dummies and gross interest income
s dependent variable in the reduced-form revenue equation.ment Finance 3 (2013) 152–166
H1 H2 H3 H4 H-statistics
ub-Saharan  Africa
ngola 0.9955 0.3473 0.7455 0.7057 0.6985
enin 0.7188 0.3407 0.5080 0.3700 0.4844
otswana 0.6988 0.4827 0.6446 0.4715 0.5744
urkina Faso 0.0834 −0.0134 0.2214 0.0633 0.0887
ameroon 0.9952 0.9319 0.7582 0.5503 0.8089
ote d‘Ivoire 0.7480 0.7986 0.6596 0.4044 0.6527
thiopia 0.3928 0.5542 −0.1230 0.4139 0.3095
hana 0.6468 0.6091 0.5593 0.4646 0.5700
enya 0.8580 0.6010 0.7540 0.8040 0.7543
adagascar 0.3022 0.1916 0.3589 0.1847 0.2594
alawi 0.7595 0.7664 0.5980 0.5417 0.6664
auritius 0.7588 0.7773 0.7588 0.7773 0.7681
ozambique 0.2761 0.4058 0.9879 0.5881 0.5645
amibia 0.7892 1.0119 0.5492 0.9375 0.8220
igeria 0.5617 0.6300 0.5159 0.4447 0.5381
enegal 0.2910 0.9772 0.4540 0.6954 0.6044
outh Africa 0.8388 0.3728 0.9455 0.6890 0.7115
waziland 1.8683 0.9345 0.3613 0.4042 0.8921
anzania 1.4148 1.0222 1.2420 0.6584 1.0843
ganda 0.4402 0.5945 0.5309 0.6447 0.5526
ambia 0.2467 0.4536 0.5480 0.4670 0.4288
imbabwe 0.6259 0.7535 0.3259 0.6148 0.5800
verage  0.6959  0.6156  0.5865  0.5407 0.6097
sia
hina 0.4982 0.6859 0.5368 0.6921 0.6032
ong Kong 0.8320 0.4771 0.8966 0.5080 0.6784
ndia 1.4050 0.5319 0.7184 0.6703 0.8314
hilippines 0.5514 0.4462 0.3937 0.3126 0.4260
ingapore −0.3960 −1.0932 1.0725 1.1085 0.1730
outh Korea 0.8908 0.7876 0.8908 0.7876 0.8392
hailand 0.6085 0.6247 0.5460 0.5446 0.5810
verage  0.6271  0.3515  0.7221  0.6605 0.5903
H1 H2 H3 H4 H-statistics
astern  and  Central  Europe
lbania 0.7340 1.7805 0.2205 1.0398 0.9437
elarus 0.7629 0.7231 0.8867 0.7836 0.7891
ulgaria 0.2798 0.3462 0.4091 0.6017 0.4092
roatia 0.5491 0.3997 0.2470 0.2730 0.3672
zech Rep. 0.4761 0.1805 0.4046 0.2374 0.3246
stonia −1.0090 0.1722 0.7440 0.6166 0.1310
ungary 0.7270 1.1808 0.8360 1.0691 0.9532
atvia 0.5910 0.5682 0.7350 0.6610 0.6388
ithuania 0.5460 0.7821 0.5810 0.7440 0.6633
oland 0.9846 0.7679 0.9050 0.7150 0.8431
omania 0.8403 0.8687 1.0150 0.8830 0.9018
ussia 0.5492 0.4900 0.6579 0.6359 0.5833
lovak Rep 0.1385 0.3415 0.8280 0.6342 0.4856
lovenia 0.5784 0.4553 0.5430 0.5838 0.5401
kraine 0.6602 0.6014 0.6874 0.6157 0.6412
verage  0.4939  0.6439  0.6467  0.6729 0.6143
atin  America
rgentina 0.5773 0.6208 0.5460 0.6460 0.5975
olivia 0.4137 0.3541 0.5782 0.5158 0.4654
razil 0.7020 0.7938 0.8669 0.8684 0.8078
hile 0.8290 0.9310 0.7910 1.0334 0.8961
olumbia 0.2538 0.7602 0.6400 0.5706 0.5562
osta Rica 0.1335 0.4803 0.7887 0.7618 0.5411
exico 0.9220 0.9220 0.9080 0.9080 0.9150
anama 0.6885 0.6209 0.5218 0.6720 0.6258
araguay 0.7500 0.7166 0.7808 0.7210 0.7421
ruguay −0.0036 0.2735 0.7486 0.7171 0.4339
enezuela 1.0715 0.1817 0.7413 0.7180 0.6781
verage  0.5762  0.6050  0.7192  0.7393 0.6599
he data comprises of 978 banks across 55 countries over the period 2000–2007.
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ppendix  B.
This section presents pair-wise correlation coefficients
etween key selected variables. The pair-wise correlation
oefficients are estimated for a sample of 978 banks across 55
ountries across the period 2000–2007. Z-score (log) is a mea-
ure of insolvency risk. Risk adjusted return on assets (RAROA)
nd of equity (RAROE) measure overall performance. Bank
quity represents average capitalization level and is used as a
roxy for the degree of risk. The degree of market power is prox-
ed by the Lerner  Index  or the price mark-up over marginal cost,
ith higher scores indicating a higher degree of pricing power.
-statistic is a measure of competitiveness in the banking sec-
or as discussed in Section 3.1. HHI(rev) and HHI(non) measure
evenue diversification across interest income and within non-
nterest income generating activities, respectively. Com ˆ2  is a
quare of commission income to non-interest income and NONˆ2
s the square of non-interest income to net-operating income.
oans is a ratio of loans to total assets and it is used as a mea-
ure of bank loan portfolios. The GDP  growth  accounts for the
ifferences in economic development across countries. Inﬂation
s the rate of inflation based on the CPI.
Z-score RAROA RAROE Equity Lerner index H-statistic 
-score 1.000
AROA 0.689* 1.000
AROE 0.512* 0.758* 1.000
quity 0.134* −0.135* −0.162* 1.000
erner Index 0.067* 0.236* 0.218* 0.131* 1.000
-statistic −0.017 0.034* 0.024* −0.027* −0.061* 1.000
HI(non) −0.053* −0.037* −0.068* 0.045* 0.070* 0.015 
HI(rev) 0.020 0.007 0.016 0.117* 0.118* −0.043*
ONˆ2 −0.127* −0.121* −0.133* 0.075* 0.033* −0.070*
omˆ2 −0.019 0.074* 0.047* −0.110* −0.039* 0.041*
oans 0.107* 0.100* 0.105* −0.124* −0.057* 0.042*
ize 0.061* 0.102* 0.051* −0.081* 0.035* 0.016 
DP growth 0.048* 0.095* 0.092* −0.086* 0.080* −0.020 
nflation −0.022 −0.012 −0.022 0.020 0.016 −0.013 
* Implies significance at 5% or more.
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